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Abstract
This paper aims to examine the influence foreign and indigenous directors have on 
determining firms’ dividend payout structure. The population for this study is the fif-
teen deposit money banks listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. Using a random 
sampling technique, a sample of 14 deposit money banks for the 2010 to 2017 period 
was taken. The total observations used for the work was 112. The study adopted a panel 
data methodology, which was estimated with a random-effect model. It was observed 
that a significant relationship exists between foreign directors and the dependent vari-
able (dividend payout structure). The dividend payout structure by dividend per share 
of sampled firms was measured. This study will improve analysts and investors’ un-
derstanding of dividend policy by giving them insights in identifying the main deter-
minants of dividend policy. For policy makers, this study reinforces the fact that good 
corporate governance is important to develop financial markets and improve the firm 
value.
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INTRODUCTION
Corporate policy of a firm stems from three main decisions taken by its 
board of directors, namely dividend, investment and financing deci-
sions. Dividend decision has become very germane in the recent finan-
cial literature (Jeon & Ryoo, 2013; Jabbouri, 2016; Baker, Kilincarslan, 
& Arsal, 2018; Ngo, Duong, Nguyen, & Nguyen, 2018). Dividends are 
payments made to shareholders to compensate them for their equity 
stake and inherent risks of the firm. The choice of whether to pay a 
higher or lower level of dividends affects the growth and value of a 
company. For example, a higher payment of dividends can hinder fur-
ther expansion and growth of a firm (Jensen, 1986). Likewise, paying a 
lower level of dividend will result in shareholders’ dissatisfaction. This 
makes dividend policy a very sensitive subject in recent times. Boards 
of directors are saddled with the responsibility of deciding how much 
should be paid as a dividend to shareholders. Dividend decision is 
highly influenced by the ownership structure of a firm. A firm can be 
owned by both indigenous and foreign shareholders, these groups of 
people together form the board of directors. Dividends can be used as 
a controlling mechanism in the process of mitigating agency problems 
that may arise in a firm (Eluyela et al., 2018a). Likewise, large institu-
tional shareholders may use their power as a means of expropriating 
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firm resources for personal benefits at the detriment of the minor shareholders. This will in turn lead to 
agency conflicts (Adetula, Eluyela, Akomolafe, Ilogho, & Adubi, 2016).
Theoretically, there have been conflicting results in the body of literature. The upper echelons theory ex-
plains that the strategic decisions of every firm are primarily influenced by background characteristics 
of the firm’s individual top executives (Reyna, 2017). These characteristics include personalities, experi-
ences, values, beliefs and other human factors. On the one hand, the positive school of thought believes 
that appointing foreign directors with different nationalities will bring different values and experience 
to the decision making process of the firm (Chen & Keefe, 2018; Paniagua, Rivelles, & Sapena, 2018). This 
will lead to a more timely and informed dividend decision.  The other school of thought believed that the 
presence of foreign directors and ownership has no significant association with determination of divi-
dend policy of such firm (Peck-Ling, Nai-Chiek, & Chee-Seong, 2016; Duygun, Guney, & Moin, 2018). 
Many of the existing literature on this subject matter focused on the developed economy where markets 
are well-regulated, like China, India, Russia, Latin America, United States of America and Germany 
(Jensen, 1986; Lee & Moffett, 2011; Jeon, Liu, Wei, & Xie, 2014; Benavides, Berggrun, & Perafan, 2016; 
Peck-Ling, Nai-Chiek, & Chee-Seong, 2016; Reyna, 2017; Cao, Du, & Hansen, 2017; Duygun et al., 2018). 
However, there are few studies in recent times from emerging countries like Nigeria. Otekunrin et al. 
(2018a) is the nearest study of corporate governance and dividend policy in Nigeria. The study, however, 
was conducted on corporate governance variables like board size, non-executive directors and executive 
directors and their effect on dividend payout. Dividend payout is particularly interesting to study on 
Nigerian deposit money banks for at least two reasons. 
The first concerns the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) policy on residual dividend policy issued on March 
2018. The residual policy states that firms are only allowed to pay dividends after settling all outstanding 
obligations and management has allocated funds for reinvestment into the business. As a result of this 
policy, it is estimated that five out of the fifteen deposit money banks will not be able to pay a dividend 
in 2018 (Otekunrin et al., 2018b). Secondly, there have been issues of non-payment of dividends among 
some deposit money banks for the past five years. However, what have been the roles of foreign direc-
tors on the dividend payout structures? This question is akin to seeking to investigate if the positive 
school of thought that prioritizes the appointment of foreign directors holds sway. Contrarily, have the 
indigenous directors been more valuable to deposit money banks in Nigeria? These questions have been 
ignored by Otekunrin et al. (2018a), but the answers are important for fashioning appropriate policies. 
In a nutshell, this study is poised to filling the identified lacuna in the literature by proffering answers 
to these questions.
In simple parlance, this work focuses on the influence foreign and indigenous directors have on de-
termining firms’ dividend payout structure, using a sample of deposit money banks in the listed 
Nigerian context from 2010 to 2017. To achieve the objective, this paper is structured as follows: the 
next section presents the literature review with the hypothesis being outlined, followed by the meth-
ods and materials used in the study. Then, the results and discussion of findings are provided. The 
paper wraps up with the conclusion, outlines suitable recommendations and provides suggestions for 
future research in this area.
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
1.1. General idea
The article reviewed the various related literature 
on the nexus between each of the independent 
variables – foreign directors, indigenous direc-
tors, non-executive directors, foreign ownership, 
and the dependent variable – dividend payout 
structure. At the end of every operationalized 
variable, the null hypothesis was formulated that 
was verified in the later section of this study. This 
study is anchored on the upper echelon theory 
(Felicio, Couto, & Caiado, 2014; Clarke, Chandra, 
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& Machado, 2016). This theory explains how stra-
tegic decisions of every firm are influenced by 
personal characteristics (culture, experience and 
skills) of the firm’s top executives. The justifica-
tion for this theory is that the decision whether to 
pay a high dividend or not depends on the person-
al characteristics of the board members who are 
made up of different cultural background, belief 
and value system, experience and qualification. 
However, the results that emanate from the em-
pirical analysis can suggest the applicability of 
theories such as the positive theory and the other 
school of thought, which contradicts the positive 
theory.
1.2. Foreign directors and dividend 
payout structure 
The issue of the firm having a diverse board has 
been a consistent debate in recent finance litera-
ture (Khan, Hassan, & Marimuthu, 2017; Nadeem, 
Zaman, & Saleem, 2017; Ozordi, Uwuigbe, Teddy, 
Tolulope, & Eyitomi, 2018). Diversity can be in age, 
gender, experience and nationalities. Empirical 
evidence from previous studies on the presence of 
foreign directors and determination of dividend 
payout structure has shown mixed results. Peck-
Ling et al. (2016) investigated the effect of foreign 
ownership and foreign directors on the profitabil-
ity of Malaysian listed companies between 1999 
and 2010. Using a sample of 348 Malaysian firms, 
the fixed effect panel regression shows that for-
eign equity ownership, the appointment of foreign 
chairman and foreign chief executive directors 
did not have a significant relationship with return 
on equity of the sampled firms. However, foreign 
directors on board have a significant effect on re-
turn on equity. Subsequently, in the Mexican con-
text, Reyna (2017) found a positive relationship 
amidst the aforementioned constructs. However, 
Jeon and Ryoo (2013) and Benavides et al. (2016) 
found an insignificant association between for-
eign directors and dividend payout structure in 
India and Korea respectively. Against this mixed 
result in the body of existing knowledge, the first 
hypothesis is stated as:
H1: There is no significant relationship between 
foreign directors and the determination of 
dividend payout structure of listed Nigerian 
deposit money banks.
1.3. Indigenous directors  
and dividend payout structure
The Nigerian indigenization policy of 1977 re-
quired that at least 60% of every company board 
of directors must be a nationality of Nigeria. 
Also, the act detailed that not less than 51% (fif-
ty-one) equity shares owned of every company 
should be held by Nigerian investors. This pol-
icy was formulated to protect and attract local 
content in all Nigerian firms. In this light, He, 
Ng, Zaiats, and Zhang (2017) believed that a 
board that has a high number of domestic di-
rectors pay more dividends than those that do 
not. This is in contrast with the work of Sierra-
Garcia, Zorio-Grima, and Garcia-Benau (2015) 
who opined that no significant relationship ex-
ists between domestic directors and dividend 
payout structure of firms. Against this mixed 
evidence found in empirical literature, this 
study hypothesized that:
H2: Indigenous directors do not have any signif-
icant impact on the determination of divi-
dend payout structure of listed Nigerian de-
posit money banks.
1.4. Non-executive directors  
and dividend payout structure
The mixture of independent non-executive di-
rectors and executive directors on board is also 
an important variable to consider. The major dif-
ference between these two important variables 
is that the former is not involved in the day to 
day running of the business enterprise (Adetula, 
2009; Ayadi, Ojo, Ayadi, & Adetula, 2015). 
Hwang, Kim, Park, and Park (2013) argued that 
a higher representation of non-executive direc-
tors on board reduces agency conflicts and gives 
room for payment of higher dividends. However, 
Chen and Keefe (2018) opined that there is no 
significant relationship between non-executive 
directors and dividend payout structure of sam-
pled deposit money banks in Nigeria. This con-
flicting evidence in empirical literature leads us 
to the following statement:
H3: Non-executive directors do not significantly 
influence the dividend payout structure of 
listed Nigerian deposit money banks.
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1.5. Foreign ownership and dividend 
payout structure
Foreign ownership is the percentage of compa-
ny shareholdings owned by foreign investors 
(Uwuigbe, Eluyela, Uwuigbe, Obakpro, & Falola, 
2018). Baba (2009) and Cao et al. (2017), using a 
choice-to-change and generalized methods of mo-
ments (GMM) model respectively, opined that a 
higher level of foreign ownership is associated with 
a significantly higher probability of dividend pay-
outs and vice versa. This is evident in the notion 
that firms that increase their dividend payout will 
attract a large proportion of foreign investors. This 
is because foreign investors are rational individuals 
and select firms that pay higher dividends. Duygun 
et al. (2018) noted that there is no relationship be-
tween foreign investors and the payment of divi-
dends in firms. Against this inconclusive result in 
literature, the fourth hypothesis is stated as follows:
H4: There is no significant relationship between 
foreign ownership and determination of div-
idend payout of listed Nigerian deposit mon-
ey banks.
2. MATERIALS  
AND METHODS
The population for this work is the fifteen de-
posit money banks listed on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange. A random sampling technique was 
used to select fourteen sampled banks. One of 
these banks was not considered as sample for 
this study because of the recent acquisition and 
change of name by the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN). The information about independent var-
iables (foreign directors, indigenous directors, 
non-executive directors, foreign ownership) and 
the dependent variable (dividend payout struc-
ture) was sourced from annual reports of sampled 
banks that were published on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange website. The time frame for this study 
is 2010–2017 representing a period of eight years. 
With a cross-section of 14 and time series of eight, 
the total observations amount to 112. The time se-
ries and cross-section dimensions here are similar 
to those of Eluyela et al. (2018b), Popoola, Asalaye, 
and Eluyela (2018). Some control variables in this 
work were added to ensure the robustness of the 
model specification (see Asaleye, Lawal, Popoola, 
Alege, & Oyetade, 2019). These variables are board 
size, firm age and firm size. As a precursor to the 
empirical results, descriptive statistics is present-
ed to provide insight on the minimum, maxi-
mum and mean value, inter alia, of each variable 
(Oladipo, Iyoha, Fakile, Asaleye, & Eluyela, 2019). 
Table 1 below shows the measurement of variables 
adopted in this work. Dividend per share is used 
as a measure of the dividend payout structure of 
sampled deposit money banks in Nigeria. The in-
dependent variables are operationalized as con-
tained in Table 1.
Table 1. Summary of variables
Source: Author’s compilation (2018).
Variable 
acronym
Variable 
name
Variable type Measurement
DPS
Dividend per 
share
Dependent
The total dividend 
paid/number of 
shares issued
FOD
Foreign 
directors
Independent
Number of foreign 
directors/total 
number of board 
members
IND
Indigenous 
directors
Independent
Number of indigenous 
directors/total 
number of board 
members
NED
Non-
executive 
directors
Independent
Number of non-
executive directors/
total number of board 
members
FOW
Foreign 
ownership
Independent
Shares owned by 
foreign directors/
total number of 
shares in the firm
FAGE Firm age Control
Number of years 
the firm has been in 
existence
FSIZE Firm size Control
Log of total assets of 
the firm
BSIZE Board size Control
Number of board 
members
3. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND 
ESTIMATION STRATEGY
3.1. Empirical model
Following Duygun et al. (2018), dividend payout 
structure is first expressed as a function of for-
eign and indigenous directors as contained in 
equation (1):
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( , ).DPS f FOD IND=  (1)
Garnering crucial insights from the literature, this 
study augments equation (1) with other important 
independent variables. This leads to equation (2), 
which is the model to be estimated.
0 1 2
3 4 5
6 ,
it it it
it it it
it i t it
DPS FOD IND
NED FAGE FSIZE
BSIZE
β β β
β β β
β δ ϕ ε
= + + +
+ + + +
+ + + +
 (2)
where DPS is a dividend per share; FOD is foreign 
directors; IND is indigenous directors; NED is 
non-executive directors; FAG is a firm age; FSIZE is a 
firm size and BSIZE is a board size. β
i
 are coefficients; 
δ
i
 and φ
t
 are time-varying and entity (firm) fixed ef-
fects, respectively. They are dummy variables as-
suming the values 1 (when dealing with a particular 
year or deposit money bank) and 0 (otherwise) (see 
Obasaju, Olayiwola, Okodua, & Obasaju (2018) for 
an alternative use of the fixed effect dummies). The 
reason for the inclusion of these fixed effects is stat-
ed under the estimation strategy (Asaleye, Adama, & 
Ogunjobi, 2018). The subscripts i and t are charac-
teristic of panel data and respectively indicate entity/
cross-section/firm specific features and a particular 
time; ε
it
 is the idiosyncratic error term which ac-
counts for other omitted independent variables.
3.2. Estimation strategy
To analyze the relationship between the independent 
variables of interest and the dependent variable (div-
idend payout), first, the Hausman test is carried out 
to choose between the fixed or random effects tech-
niques. A significant estimate supports the fixed ef-
fects technique, otherwise, a random effect is appro-
1 Any collinearity is also dealt with as the software automatically drops any variables that can induce collinearity/multicollinearity into the 
model.
2 The inclusion of the fixed effects can also serve to mitigate the possibilities of reverse causations.
priate. To allow for heteroscedasticity and serial cor-
relation1, the cluster-robust Huber/White standard 
errors are used. This makes it possible to obtain relia-
ble standard error estimates. With the cluster-robust 
standard errors, each individual, in the present case, 
each firm, can be treated as a cluster. And as shown 
in equation (2), both time and cross-sectional fixed 
effects are included (dummy variables). This is in 
order to account for variables which vary with time 
and across entities (firms), which are not included 
in the model but have influence on the dependent 
variable2. To investigate the robustness of the em-
pirical estimates, the least square dummy variable 
(LSDV) technique is employed. The choice of LSDV 
follows from the excess of the cross-section dimen-
sion (14 firms) over the time series dimension (eight 
years) (see Greene, 2008; Ashley, 2012; and Asaleye, 
Popoola, Lawal, Ogundipe & Ezenwoke, 2018). 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The summary statistic of variables is first present-
ed in Table 2.
From Table 2, the dividend per share and foreign 
ownership do not have data for a few years. These 
two variables, including the non-executive direc-
tors (NED), also have minimum values of zero. 
Next, the result of the Hausman test is presented. 
This is followed by the empirical results.
Table 3. The Hausman test for the choice 
between fixed or random effects
Source: Authors’ using STATA software.
Chi-square 0.00
Prob. (Chi-square) 1.000
Table 2. Summary statistic
Source: Authors’ using STATA software.
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
DPS 92 0.590 0.592 0 2.45
FOD 104 0.141 0.130 0 0.538
IND 112 0.868 0.131 0.462 1
BSIZE 112 14.161 2.915 7 25
NED 112 0.590 0.116 0 0.833
FSIZE 112 11.646 0.756 9.010 12.684
FAGE 112 39.786 27.990 4 123
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With the insignificant value of the chi-square as 
shown by its probability (1.000), it may be conclud-
ed that the random effect technique is appropriate 
(see Table 3). Table 3 reports the results using the 
random effect technique while also including the 
LSDV estimates to check the sensitivity of the re-
sults to the technique used.
Table 4. Empirical results
Source: Authors’ using STATA software.
Variable Random effects LSDV
FOD
2.330**
(1.026)
[2.27]
2.330**
(0.957)
[2.43]
IND
0.709
(0.821)
[0.86]
0.709
(0.878)
[0.81]
BSIZE
–0.044
(0.037)
[–1.20]
–0.044**
(0.020)
[–2.17]
NED
–0.980**
(0.435)
[–2.25]
–0.980*
(0.503)
[–1.94]
FSIZE
0.135*
(0.082)
[1.65]
0.135*
(0.073)
[1.84]
FAGE
0.058***
(0.008)
[7.17]
0.021
(0.026)
[0.81]
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
F-stat. {Wald Chi-square}
Prob. of F{Prob. of Wald 
Chi-square}
0.824
–
{34.99}
{0.000}
0.824
0.757
3.32
0.001
Time fixed effects Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes
Notes: The R-squared for the Random Effects estimates 
indicate the overall R-squared. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Values in ( ) and [] denote standard errors and t (or z) statistic, 
respectively. In the lower segment of Table 3, values in { } 
denote the Wald Chi-square or its probability.
The overall tests of the significance of the model 
and the goodness of fit indicate that the model, 
irrespective of the technique used, is significant. 
This is shown by the high significance of Wald 
Chi-Square – even at one percent level (in the case 
of random effects) and the F-statistics (in the case 
of LSDV). The values of the R-squared and the 
Adjusted R-squared, which are respectively 0.824 
and 0.757, indicate that the model has a good fit 
(see Table 3). They respectively suggest that the in-
dependent variables explain over 82 and 76 per-
cent variation in the dependent variable – divi-
dend payout structure. 
The presence of foreign directors (FOD) in the 
Nigerian deposit banks is clearly a plus, as this 
variable is positive and statistically significant at 
the five percent level as estimated by both tech-
niques. Thus, the study rejects the null hypothesis 
that there is no significant relationship between 
foreign directors and dividend payout structure 
by the Nigerian deposit banks. This points to the 
fact that the presence of more foreign directors 
positively and significantly boosts the abilities of 
the Nigerian deposit banks to pay out dividends to 
their customers. This may result from the experi-
ence and knowledge brought on board by foreign 
directors. This result correlates with Peck-Ling et 
al. (2016) and Reyna (2017) who conclude that the 
presence of foreign directors on board has a posi-
tive and significant influence on the determining 
dividend payout. However, Jeon and Ryoo (2013) 
and Benavides et al. (2016) opined that the pres-
ence of foreign expatriate on board has a positive 
insignificant influence on dividend payouts.
For the indigenous directors (IND), this variable 
has a positive coefficient, which implies that the 
presence of indigenous directors increases div-
idend payouts. But in terms of the degree of in-
fluence, this variable is not statistically significant. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis of no significant re-
lationship between this variable and the dependent 
variable cannot be rejected. The import of this is 
that although the presence of indigenous directors 
improves dividend payouts in the Nigerian depos-
it banking sector, the extent to which their pres-
ence boosts dividend payouts is not sufficient; the 
two techniques agree with this conclusion. Hence, 
when the two sets of directors are placed side-by-
side, the influence of foreign directors, in terms of 
their value-generating impact (which in this con-
text is the ability to payout dividends), is strong-
er than that of indigenous directors. One of the 
implications of this empirical outcome for policy 
is that, if Nigerian directors seek to meaningful-
ly improve the dividend payout structure of their 
banks when they are at the helm of affairs, the 
need to understudy the practices of their foreign 
counterparts is exigent. From a similar perspec-
tive, this finding may be taken to mean a wakeup 
call for indigenous directors to up their knowl-
edge horizons in areas that can aid value addition 
in respect of the payout dividend structure. This 
finding corroborates Sierra-Garcia, Zorio-Grima, 
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and Garcia-Benau (2015) who believe that the 
presence of indigenous directors on top level man-
agement has a positive insignificant impact on the 
determination of dividend payout structure but is 
in contrast with He, Ng, Zaiats, and Zhang (2017).
The third independent variable of interest is the 
non-executive directors (NED). The two tech-
niques conclude that the presence of non-execu-
tive directors at the helm of affairs does more harm 
than good. In fact, their presence significantly re-
duces the ability of the deposit banks in Nigeria 
to pay out dividends to the shareholders. The null 
hypothesis that there is no significant relationship 
between these variables is hereby rejected. The 
negative and significant impact suggests the need 
for deposit banks to have a rethink when trying 
to bring non-executive directors on board when it 
comes to the day-to-day running of their organi-
zation. This finding resonates with Hwang, Kim, 
Parkand, and Park (2013) who attest to the signifi-
cant relationship that exists amidst similar varia-
ble constructs. However, it contradicts the work of 
Chen and Keefe (2018) who opined that inclusion 
of non-executive directors on board has an insig-
nificant impact on dividend payout determination.
Considering the control variables, the board size 
(BSIZE), that is the number of members on board, 
reduces dividend payouts of deposit money banks 
in Nigeria; the two techniques agree in this re-
spect. But in terms of significance, the random ef-
fects show that although having more members 
on board reduces the dividend payout, this reduc-
tion is not to a significant degree. The LSDV es-
timate, however, shows that the reduction is to a 
significant degree. Considering the disparity in 
the estimates of the two techniques in the area of 
statistical significance, it may be safely conclud-
ed that increases in board size shrinks dividend 
3 The fact that the firm size is also dependent on some factors, which may be used to increase its value, this variable may exhibit an 
endogenous nature. Yet, as stated under the estimation strategy, the inclusion of the time and entity/firm fixed effects are counted on to 
mitigate the possibilities of reverse causations. Foreign ownership (as a variable) was excluded for a similar reason. The initial inclusion 
of this variable (foreign ownership) ‘corrupted’ the results, that is, led to implausible estimates. Thus, this variable was dropped from the 
modelling exercise. 
per share given by the Nigerian deposit banks to 
their customers. In essence, empirical evidences 
from this study suggest the need to discourage 
having large numbers of members on the board of 
Nigerian deposit banks. The reason for this nega-
tive implication of board size for dividend payout 
may not be unconnected to that part of the total 
dividend carted away by the large size of board 
members. This is especially likely in the event that 
some of the board members have high propen-
sities of engaging in ‘sharp’ practices to the det-
riment of dividend per shareholder. But a ‘sharp’ 
practice is just a conjecture as this is not factored 
into the present model. 
Firm size (FSIZE) is another control variable in-
cluded in the model. The two techniques conclude, 
as expected, that the larger the total assets of a de-
posit bank, the more their ability to pay out divi-
dends. This variable is, however, weakly significant 
as both techniques show that it is only significant 
at the 10 percent level. At any rate, the positive and 
significant nexus between firm size and dividend 
payout reinforces the need for the directors of the 
Nigerian deposit banks to find more innovative 
means (legal means) to increase their total assets3. 
Finally, the age of a firm (FAGE) is another var-
iable included to control for the age of a deposit 
money bank. The two techniques depict that this 
variable positively influences the ability of deposit 
banks to give out dividends. The random effects 
show that firm age is both a positive and signifi-
cant driver of dividend payout by deposit banks 
in Nigeria, while the LSDV’s estimate shows that 
it is a positive but not significant driver. Yet, what 
is clear is that whether or not it is to a significant 
degree, firms are able to give out more dividends 
to their customers as they increase in age. 
CONCLUSION
The article analyzed one of the most fundamental business decisions that directly influence the spirit 
of any investor. Thus, the focus was on assessing the influence foreign and indigenous directors have 
on determining a firm dividend payout structure, using a sample of deposit money banks in the list-
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ed Nigerian context, taking a reference from 2010 to 2017. The variables found to be significant deter-
minants of dividend payout structure of the Nigerian deposit money banks include foreign directors, 
non-executive directors, firm size and firm age. But the presence of non-executive directors was found 
to exert a negative impact on the dividend payout. The result of this study has practical implications 
for investors, analysts and regulators. This study will improve analysts and investors’ understanding of 
dividend policy by giving them insights in identifying the main determinants of dividend policy. For 
policy makers, this study reinforces the understanding that good corporate governance is important in 
developing financial markets and improving firm value. The major limitation of this study is in relation 
to the sampled population considered. The study only examined the influence of foreign directors and 
indigenous directors on determination of dividend payout structure of deposit money banks in Nigeria. 
Further studies can look at other sectors listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange.
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